Alexander Pruss has an interesting post (of which I understood very little, but I get the gist), arguing that the commonly used argument from randomness against Libertarian free will applies to the compatibilism as well.
Most Christians (unless you teach at Fuller) will hold some sort of mind/body dualism. That is, the mind is not a physical object. If this is so, can one speak of the mind using physical-causal language? Is it right to think of the relations of ideas as one thinks of the relations of two objects interacting causally? Does a non-materialist view of the mind eliminate objections to free will (i.e., classical combatibalism expressed in similar ways by Christians such as Augustine, Calvin, and Edwards)?
Proposal 1: To avoid theological confusion and controversy, maybe the language of “free will” should be replaced with “morally responsible agency,” because isn’t that what most people are trying to say anyways?
Proposal 2: When speaking about the belief of “free will” in the Early Church, understand what they meant by free will in their own context because the concept has changed over time